Warrantless Searches and Seizures in Virginia by Bacigal, Ronald J.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1983
Warrantless Searches and Seizures in Virginia
Ronald J. Bacigal
University of Richmond, rbacigal@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Bacigal, Warrantless Searches and Seizures in Virginia, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 721 (1983).
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN VIRGINIA
Ronald J. Bacigal*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a well-recognized lack of consistency and clarity in
fourth amendment decisions. At times, each search and seizure
case seenis unique and the decisions appear to rest on factual de-
terminations rather than on legal principles. Nonetheless, it is de-
sirable to have some understanding of the basic principles of the
fourth amendment, and the way in which these principles affect
individual cases.
At the most basic level the fourth amendment can be viewed as
serving two distinct purposes: (1) protection of the privacy inter-
ests of individual citizens; and (2) regulation of police investigatory
activities.1 These two purposes are at times complementary but
can also conflict, and a court's choice between the two purposes
can lead to opposite results. For example, in a case involving an
intrusion into the body, such as surgery to remove a bullet, or body
cavity searches for drugs, defense counsel is likely to emphasize the
extreme invasion of privacy, while the prosecution will focus upon
the rational and reasonable procedures the police followed when
intruding upon privacy.2 On the other hand, a case involving ran-
dom stops of automobiles saw the prosecution emphasizing the
minimal invasion of privacy caused by a brief stop, while the de-
fense focused upon the absence of any control over the police
power to select motorists in an arbitrary or capricious manner.3
The second source of difficulty in fourth amendment cases is the
*Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., Concord College; 1964, LL.B., Washing-
ton & Lee University, 1967.
This article is an excerpt from the author's recently published VIRmINI CRIMINAL PROCE-
DuRE and is reproduced with permission of the copyright owner, The Harrison Co., Nor-
cross, Ga. The article is intended to stand alone as an informative discussion of warrantless
searches. Murray Janus reviews the book at page 881 of this issue.
1. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Lee v. Winston, 551 F. Supp.
247 (W.D. Va. 1982).
3. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1970).
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relationship of the amendment's two conjunctive clauses.4 The first
clause provides for the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures," while the second clause provides that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." The United States Supreme
Court's vacillation over the requirement for a search warrant has
been referred to as a form of judicial schizophrenia. At times, the
Court insists that warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable"
subject only to a few "well-delineated exceptions."" At other times,
the Court refers to reasonableness as the ultimate standard for de-
termining constitutional searches, and notes that reasonableness
can only be determined by examining the particular facts of each
case.6 The underlying rationale for "well-delineated exceptions"
differs from the rationale for "reasonable" warrantless searches.
Most of the "well-delineated exceptions" appear to focus on the
need for immediate action and the impracticality of obtaining a
warrant.7 "Reasonable" warrantless searches are upheld, however,
even if the police bypassed an opportunity to obtain a search war-
rant. "Reasonable" warrantless searches appear to be justified by
focusing upon the balancing of important government interests
against what is usually labeled a "de minimis" intrusion upon
privacy."
For purposes of analysis, warrantless searches have been placed
in two categories:
(1) Exceptions based on the need for immediate action:
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. See Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable
Cause, 68 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1977).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-59 (Repl. Vol. 1983) provides that "no officer of the law or any other
person shall search any place, thing or person, except by virtue of and under a warrant
issued by a proper officer." Despite this restrictive language, the Virginia Supreme Court
has recognized those exceptions to the fourth amendment which have been adopted by the
United States Supreme Court. Thims v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
7. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), the Court stated "that the police must, when-
ever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures."
8. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
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(a) Search of person incident to arrest
(b) Search of area under control of person arrested
(c) Hot pursuit
(d) Stop and frisk
(e) Exigent circumstances
(f) Plain view
(g) Search of vehicles incident to arrest
(h) Search of vehicles pursuant to exigent circumstances
(2) Exceptions based on "reasonableness" (a lessened expecta-
tion of privacy):
(a) Consent by the defendant




(f) Search of vehicles based on an inventory or a diminished expec-
tation of privacy
(g) Search of inmates
In addition, administrative searches, a separate category of
searches, give rise to another set of exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
These categories must be approached with some caution as
courts often mix together the underlying rationales. For example,
the search of motor vehicles can be placed in a number of distinct
categories depending upon the rationale put forth in the particular
case.
II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
A. Exceptions Based on the Need for Immediate Action
1. Search of Person Incident to Arrest
A search incident to arrest is invalid unless the arrest itself is
lawful.9 The search must be "incident to" or "substantially con-
temporaneous" with the lawful arrest. The search may actually
precede the arrest if the search and arrest are nearly simultaneous
and the police have probable cause to arrest at the time the search
9. Hart v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 283, 269 S.E.2d 806 (1980). For a discussion of arrests,
see R. BACIGAL, VIRGINIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 2-1 to -7 (1983).
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takes place.' 0 The defendant may be searched at the place of the
arrest or when he is administratively processed at the jail." Even a
"substantial delay" (ten hours) between the arrest and the taking
of the defendant's clothing for use as evidence has been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court.' 2
The basis of the "search incident" exception is the need for po-
lice to take immediate action to guard against the defendant's use
of weapons to resist arrest or effect an escape, and to prevent the
defendant from destroying evidence. 13 These underlying justifica-
tions for the exception limit the surrounding area which may be
searched, 4 but do not determine the limits of a proper search of
the arrestee's person. The search of the arrestee's person is further
justified by the United States Supreme Court's determination that
a person who has been taken into custody retains no significant
expectation of privacy.' 5 A custodial arrest, thus, justifies a search
of the person, and the police need not point to particular facts sug-
gesting the presence of weapons or easily destructible evidence. 6
By statute, "strip searches" may not be conducted of persons
arrested for traffic infractions, Class 3 or 4 misdemeanors, or viola-
tions of city, county or town ordinances which are punishable by
less than 30 days in jail.17
2. Search of Area Under Control of Person Arrested
In Chimel v. California,8 the United States Supreme Court held
that officers have the right to search not only the defendant, but
also the area within his immediate control. While there is no right
10. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Wright v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 278
S.E.2d 849 (1981); Italiano v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 334, 200 S.E.2d 526 (1973).
11. Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
12. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
13. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
14. See infra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
15. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
16. See cases cited supra note 15.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-59.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983). Strip searches are defined as "having an
arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his clothing so as to permit a visual inspec-
tion of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts, or undergarments of such person." Id.
Strip searches must be conducted by persons of the same sex as the person arrested and out
of the sight of all other persons. "Body cavity" searches must be conducted under the super-
vision of medically trained personnel. Id.
18. 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see also Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 223 S.E.2d 887
(1976).
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to search an entire house as an incident of lawful arrest, a search
may be made in the area into which the arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items. Identifying the area
or items "within lunging distance"'19 of the arrestee is obviously a
factual question. "Unlike searches of the person .. .searches of
possessions within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justi-
fied by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the ar-
rest."20 The search of areas under the control of the arrestee,
therefore, can only be justified by the practical need to remove
weapons and evidence from the defendant's control.
The courts have not been impressed with the argument that an
arrestee in the secure grip of the police (e.g., handcuffed) is no
longer a real threat to seize weapons or evidence. 21 The courts as-
sume that such an arrestee still has considerable freedom of move-
ment even though he is under the control of the police. The courts
have attached greater significance to the police practice of remov-
ing items from the control of the arrestee. In United States v.
Chadwick, the Court held that "[o]nce law enforcement officers
have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately
associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive con-
tro.l, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a
search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. '22
The search of an area under the control of the arrestee must be
made substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. The Virginia
Supreme Court has allowed a search of a motel room to take place
10 to 30 seconds after the arrestee was taken from the room. 23 The
United States Supreme Court has upheld a search for weapons
conducted just before the defendant was arrested.24 Areas and
items not accessible to the defendant at the time of arrest may
subsequently come under his control. The police may not arrest a
person and then bring that person into contact with his posses-
sions for the purpose of conducting a search incident to arrest.25
19. State v. Bracco, 15 Or. App. 672, 517 P.2d 335 (1973).
20. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977).
21. See United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973).
22. 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). In Chadwick, the search of the footlocker also took place more
than an hour after the arrest occurred. See infra notes 60-98 and accompanying text.
23. Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 802 (1970).
24. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text
for a discussion of hot pursuit.
25. United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973).
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The police, however, do have the authority to "monitor the move-
ments of an arrested person" and to remain at his "elbow at all
times. '28 While properly accompanying the arrestee, the officer
may observe seizable items, and such items may be seized under
the "plain view" doctrine.
3. Hot Pursuit
In Warden v. Hayden,28 the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement. The
case, typical of the hot pursuit exception, involved a fleeing robber
who entered a certain house. The police, informed of the robbery,
knocked at the house, were admitted, and searched the entire
house. Hayden, who was found in an upstairs bedroom feigning
sleep, was arrested. Meanwhile, an officer discovered a shotgun and
pistol in the adjoining bathroom, while another policeman found a
jacket and trousers of the kind worn by the robber in a washing
machine in the basement.
The Supreme Court affirmed the warrantless search, stating that
under the exigencies of the situation, the search was imperative.
"The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay
in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger
their lives or the lives of others. ' 29 Where speed is essential, a
thorough search for persons and weapons is permissible to insure
that the police can gain control of all weapons which can be used
against them or to effect an escape.
4. Stop and Frisk
In a stop-and-frisk situation, there is a limited right to check for
weapons.80
5. Exigent Circumstances
Many of the "well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant clause
requirement are merely specific types of exigent circumstances.3 1
26. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
27. Id. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of plain view.
28. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Kirkpat-
rick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 802 (1970).
29. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
30. For a discussion of stop and frisk, see BACIGAL, supra note 9, §§ 3-1 to -4.
31. See supra notes 5-S and accompanying text.
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Search incident to arrest, hot pursuit, and stop and frisk are par-
ticular types of emergencies which occur often enough that the
courts treat them as separate exceptions to the warrant clause.
What is considered in this section is the basic rationale which is
used to identify exigent circumstances which do not fit within the
other well-established categories.
An exigent circumstance can be defined as a situation where the
law enforcement officer confronts "an immediate major crisis in
the performance of duty [which] affords neither time nor opportu-
nity to apply to a magistrate. '3 2 In Camara v. Municipal Court,33
the Court spoke of dispensing with the warrant requirement when-
ever "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search. 3 4 In determining
whether the delay to obtain a warrant will frustrate the purpose of
the search, the courts have considered three factors: 5 (1) the time
required to obtain a warrant; (2) the time required to frustrate the
search by destroying or altering the object of the search; and (3)
the likelihood that the destruction or alteration will take place.""
The first factor requires the court to examine the particular facts
and assess the difficulty or ease with which a warrant could have
been obtained. The time required to obtain a warrant will obvi-
ously vary according to the physical setting involved (e.g., urban
vs. rural community), the number of magistrates on duty,37 and the
time of day or night.3 8 The second factor requires the court to as-
sess the difficulty or ease with which the purpose of the search
could be frustrated, most typically by the defendant's destruction
of the sought-after evidence. Such a determination again requires
close examination of the particular facts. For example, there is a
32. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
33. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
34. Id. at 533. See also Wright v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 278 S.E.2d 849 (1981).
35. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978), the Court rejected a proposed "mur-
der scene" exception and noted that "the seriousness of the offense under investigation
[does not] itself [create] exigent circumstances. . . ." Many lower courts regard the gravity
of the suspected offense as a factor to be considered. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 572
F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
36. See generally Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U.
RICH. L. REv. 249 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Shepard v. State, 319 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (considering the
efficiency of the administrative machinery for issuing a warrant). See also Fore v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. 1007, 265 S.E.2d 729 (1980).
38. Raffield v. State, 333 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (difficulty of obtaining a
warrant on Christmas Eve); People v. Torres, 45 A.D.2d 185, 357 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1974) (diffi-
culty of obtaining a warrant on Saturday night).
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great difference in the time required to dismantle a bootleg still,
and the time required to flush a small quantity of drugs down a
nearby commode."e
The third factor, determining the likelihood that destruction of
evidence will occur, is perhaps the most difficult determination.
Except in rare cases, 40 the sought-after evidence will not self-de-
struct, and an affirmative act is required by some party to destroy
or alter the evidence. The courts, therefore, must assess the
probability that someone-will act to destroy the evidence. If the
defendant himself has the power to destroy the evidence, the
courts assume that he is likely to avail himself of the opportu-
nity. 41 The likelihood that third parties will destroy evidence, how-
ever, is much less clear. In Vale v. Louisiana,42 the United States
Supreme Court was not impressed by the possibility that defend-
ant's mother and brother could destroy evidence. The Court, per-
haps in dicta, indicated that an emergency exists only when the
actual destruction of evidence is imminent. 3 Lower courts have
been much more willing to recognize the threat of third party de-
struction of evidence as sufficient exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless search.44
A warrantless search is one possible response to an emergency
situation; an alternative response would be for the police to "freeze
the status quo" (act to prevent the destruction of evidence) until a
warrant can be obtained. The United States Supreme Court has
not ruled upon this issue45 but some lower courts have recognized
39. See, e.g., United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1976); Keeter & Bray v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 134, 278 S.E.2d 841 (1981) .
40. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the police took a blood sample to test
the alcohol content of the suspect's blood. Since alcohol is absorbed by the blood system,
the police knew that the evidence was presently being destroyed through the mere passage
of time without the need for any affirmative act by the suspect.
41. The assumption that defendants will destroy incriminating evidence is the basis of
the search incident to arrest exception, see supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text, and
one form of "no-knock" exception, see BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-14.
42. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
43. Id. at 34. See also United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1970), where the
court stated: "There is almost always a partisan who might destroy or conceal evidence."
44. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Gardner, 553 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973);
Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 265 S.E.2d 729 (1980); Thims v. Commonwealth, 218
Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977).
45. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980), the Court noted that "the legality
of temporarily detaining a person at the scene of suspected drug activity to secure a search
warrant may be an open question."
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the power of police to detain and monitor the actions of third par-
ties who might destroy evidence.4
6. Plain View
The plain view exception to the warrant requirement must be
distinguished from the concept known as "open view" or "open
fields. ' 47 The open view/open fields concept addresses the question
of whether the police infringed upon the defendant's expectation
of privacy (i.e., conducted a search).48 Stated conversely, the open
view/open fields doctrine addresses the issue of whether the de-
fendant knowingly exposed an item to public view and, thus, had
no expectation of privacy protected by the fourth amendment.
In contrast to the concept of open view, the plain view doctrine
involves the seizure of an item in which the defendant unquestion-
ably maintained an expectation of privacy. Like other exceptions,
the plain view doctrine authorizes a warrantless invasion of this
expectation of privacy; but unlike other exceptions, the plain view
doctrine authorizes only a warrantless seizure, not a warrantless
search.49 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,50 the Court listed three
requirements for plain view seizures: (1) the police were lawfully in
a position to view the seizable item; (2) it is immediately apparent
to the police that what is in plain view is an item subject to
seizure; and (3) the discovery of the item was "inadvertent."
Under the first requirement the police must establish their justi-
fication for being in a place where they could view the seizable
item. If the police have entered private property or any area pro-
tected by the fourth amendment, they must justify their initial in-
trusion into the area by pointing to an arrest or search warrant,51
or to one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. For example, the police may lawfully enter the defendant's
premises pursuant to a search warrant for narcotics. If while prop-
46. See, e.g., United States v. Tate, 648 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1981); Keeter & Bray v. Com-
monwealth, 222 Va. 134, 278 S.E.2d 841 (1981); Ferdin v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. App. 3d
774, 112 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1974).
47. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
48. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-3.
49. Plain view "applies only where there was no search for the object seized." Lugar v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 612, 202 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1974).
50. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
51. Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 275 S.E.2d 620 (1981); Upton v. Common-
wealth, 211 Va. 445, 177 S.E.2d 528 (1970).
52. Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974).
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erly searching for the narcotics, the police come across obscene
materials, the police will point to the search warrant as the justifi-
cation for entry of the premises and point to the plain view doc-
trine as justification for seizure of the obscene material. 3 The ini-
tial intrusion which must be justified before the plain view
doctrine applies is not merely an intrusion into private premises
but the particular intrusion into a specific part of the general
premises. In Holloman v. Commonwealth,54 the police were law-
fully on the premises and could legitimately examine all containers
which might contain the beer and whiskey listed in the search war-
rant. The search warrant did not justify the examination of small
containers which could not hide beer and whiskey. Items thus
found within the small containers were not subject to plain view
seizure because the police could not justify their intrusion into the
containers.
The second requirement for plain view seizures is that the ob-
served item be immediately recognizable as a seizable item. In
Upton v. Commonwealth,55 the police found seven "nude" pictures
while searching a drawer for narcotics. The police seized the pic-
tures as evidence of the defendant's intent to "sell, rent, lend,
transport, or commercially distribute" ' obscene materials. The
Virginia Supreme Court held the seizure unlawful, because nudity
does not automatically constitute obscenity; thus, the police could
not have immediately recognized the nude pictures as seizable evi-
dence of a crime.
The most unsettled aspect of the plain view doctrine is the re-
quirement that discovery of an item in plain view be "inadver-
tent." The "inadvertence" requirement was promulgated by a plu-
rality of the Justices in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.57 The
plurality opinion indicated that when the discovery of an item is
"anticipated" (i.e., where the police know in advance the nature
and location of the item) the plain view doctrine does not apply.
The plurality appeared to regard anticipated discovery as a form of
planned warrantless seizure which would frustrate both the war-
53. See Upton v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 445, 177 S.E.2d 528 (1970) (seizure held unlaw-
ful because obscene material not immediately recognizable as seizable). See also United
States v. Crouch, 648 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1981).
54. 221 Va. 947, 275 S.E.2d 620 (1981).
55. 211 Va. 445, 177 S.E.2d 528 (1970). See also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649
(1980).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-228 (repealed 1975).
57. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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rant requirement and the fourth amendment's function in check-
ing police power.58 The binding precedential effect of the "inadver-
tence" requirement is uncertain, since it represented the view of
only a plurality of the Justices. The most recent Virginia case,
however, appears to have adopted the requirement.5 9
7. Search of Vehicles Incident to Arrest
It is doubtful that there is a single "automobile" exception to
the warrant requirement.60 The United States Supreme Court has
upheld automobile searches incident to arrest, pursuant to "exi-
gent circumstances,""1 and on the theory that individuals have a
"lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle."62 The present
section addresses the search of vehicles incident to arrest, while
subsequent sections consider the search of an automobile under ex-
igent circumstances, 63 and the inventory of automobiles in which
defendants have a lessened expectation of privacy.6 4
The purpose of a search incident to arrest is to locate weapons
and evidence related to the offense for which the arrest is made. 5
In order to justify a search of a vehicle incident to arrest, the ini-
tial arrest must be valid,6 6 and the defendant must be in or very
near the vehicle. The arresting officer may then search that area of
the vehicle which is under the control of the defendant.6 7 In New
York v. Belton,"5 the United States Supreme Court held that
"when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occu-
58. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-1.
59. Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 275 S.E.2d 620 (1981).
60. See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not -
A Rationale In Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987 (1976).
61. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
62. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); Shirley v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 49, 235
S.E.2d 432 (1977).
63. See infra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
65. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-9.
66. An indiscriminate stop of a vehicle without probable cause was held invalid in Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). If there is a valid custodial arrest of the driver, the
driver's person may be searched. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). If the
driver is merely stopped in order to issue a citation, the driver may be ordered to exit the
automobile. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). If upon exiting the vehicle, the
officer has reason to believe the driver is armed and dangerous, the officer may frisk the
driver for weapons. Id.
67. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Kirby v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 806,
167 S.E.2d 411 (1969).
68. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
1983]
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pant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automo-
bile."69 The Court adopted this straightforward rule7 0 with respect
to the interior of vehicles, in order to avoid endless litigation over
the question of which particular areas of the interior were actually
within "lunging distance" of the defendant.7 '
While the interior of the automobile can always be searched inci-
dent to arrest, the same is not necessarily true of the vehicle's
trunk. Unless the autombile's trunk is an area under the immedi-
ate control of the defendant, the search of the trunk must be justi-
fied by probable cause to search. Of course, in a given case there
may be both probable cause to arrest the driver and probable
cause to search the car, but the two theories are distinct and
should not be confused.72
When legitimately searching any portion of the vehicle which is
under the control of the arrestee, the police may encounter a
sealed container, as, for example, a suitcase,73  footlocker, 4
wrapped package, 5 or a paper bag. 6 In New York v. Belton,7 7 the
Court permitted the police to open the zippered pockets of a jacket
found in the passenger compartment because "if the passenger
compartment is within the reach of the arrestee, so also will con-
tainers in it be within his reach." While the Court has never ad-
dressed a search incident to arrest of containers found in the trunk
of the arrestee's vehicle,7 8 the rationale of Belton seems to apply to
all portions of the automobile which are under the control of the
69. Id. at 460. The Court went on to state that "the police may also examine the contents
of any containers found within the passenger compartment." Id.
70. Justice Powell noted that dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule spurs the Court to
"reduce its analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a fighting chance
not to blunder." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (concurring opinion).
71. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
72. Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 123, 216 S.E.2d 60 (1975); McKoy v. Common-
wealth, 212 Va. 224, 183 S.E.2d 153 (1971). See infra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
73. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
74. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
75. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
76. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
77. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
78. The Court in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), limited its holding to the
search of vehicles based on probable cause to search and did not deal with search incident
to arrest. In Ross, the Court noted that United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), dealt
only with the government's argument that all movable containers found in public are sub-
ject to a warrantless search. 456 U.S. at 812.
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arrestee. 9 If the trunk is within reach of the arrestee, so also will
containers in the trunk be within his reach.80
8. Search of Vehicles Based on Exigent Circumstances
In Carroll v. United States,81 the Supreme Court held that
automobiles may be searched without a warrant when: (1) there is
probable cause to believe that seizable items are within the vehicle,
and (2) it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
could be moved while the police look for a magistrate. The inher-
ent mobility of automobiles was thus recognized as one of the first
forms of exigent circumstances.82 The requirement for mobility,
however, has been eroded by recent decisions. Chambers v. Ma-
roneyss held that if the emergency existed at the time the vehicle
was stopped, the search of the automobile could take place after
the vehicle was immobilized and taken to the police station. In
Patty v. Commonwealth,4 the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a
warrantless search even though the automobile had been immobi-
lized and the police had ample time to obtain a search warrant.8 5
While the particular automobile's mobility or lack thereof is now a
questionable requirement, the courts continue to require that the
police have full probable cause to search the vehicle.8
The search of containers found in a vehicle has had a checkered
history.8 7 In its most recent decision, United States v. Ross,8 8 the
Supreme Court rejected those previous holdings and rationales
79. In Belton, the Court noted that while the police could not search all the drawers in an
arrestee's house simply because the police had arrested him at home, the drawers within an
arrestee's reach could be searched because of the danger their contents might pose to the
police. 453 U.S. at 461.
80. Justice Powell has noted his willingness to give police broad powers in search incident
cases so that the officer would not be required "to make close calculations about danger to
himself or the vulnerability of evidence." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 431 (1981)
(concurring opinion).
81. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also Vass v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 740, 204 S.E.2d 280
(1974).
82. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
83. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See also Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
84. 218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d 437 (1977).
85. See also Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 265 S.E.2d 729 (1980); Thims v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977).
86. Saunders v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 294, 237 S.E.2d 150 (1977).
87. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977).
88. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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which were inconsistent with the decision in Ross. 9 The Court
held that if there is probable cause to believe that a seizable item"0
is located in the vehicle, the proper scope of the search is not de-
fined by the nature of the container in which the item is secreted.
A lawful search "generally extends to the entire area in which the
object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possi-
bility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to
complete the search."91 The Court thus refused to recognize any
"nice distinctions" between glove compartments, upholstered
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages. If there is probable cause to
believe a seizable item is located in the vehicle, police may search
any container or any part of the vehicle where the item could be
located.2
The holding in Ross throws doubt upon the continuing validity
of the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Abell v. Common-
wealth.93 In Abell, the court held illegal an "exigent circum-
stances" search of an attache case found in the vehicle's trunk. 4
The court found that the police had probable cause to stop and
search the automobile, but the court noted that the exigent cir-
cumstances ceased when the vehicle's keys were removed, and the
attache case came within the exclusive control of the officers. Hav-
ing eliminated the risk that the vehicle could be moved "there was
no reason why [the police] could not have obtained a warrant
before conducting the search."9' 5 Abell relied upon the rationale of
Arkansas v. Sanders," a rationale which was specifically rejected
in Ross. It should also be noted that although the Virginia Su-
preme Court later referred to Abell as a search incident to arrest
case,17 this appears to be a misstatement as the Abell opinion
clearly notes that "the present case does not involve . ..a war-
89. The Court specifically referred to Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
90. Ross dealt with contraband, but the rationale would seem to apply to any seizable
item. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-6.
91. 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (footnote omitted).
92. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982). See generally BACIGAL, supra note 9, §
4-6.
93. 221 Va. 607, 272 S.E.2d 204 (1980).
94. But see Hamby v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 257, 279 S.E.2d 163 (1981) (upholding the
search of a briefcase found in the vehicle's interior during an "inventory" of the automo-
bile). See infra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
95. Abell, 221 Va. at 614, 272 S.E.2d at 209.
96. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
97. Hamby, 222 Va. at 262, 279 S.E.2d at 166.
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rantless search incident to arrest."98
B. Exceptions Based on Reasonableness
1. Consent by the Defendant
Valid consent to a search eliminates the need to obtain a search
warrant and the need for probable cause.9  The only justification
for the search that the government need offer is that the defend-
ant's 00 consent to search was "freely and voluntarily given." 101
The burden of proof is on the prosecution to demonstrate that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.102
The same standard applies in determining the voluntariness of a
consent to search as pertains to confessions.0o A court thus looks
to the totality of the surrounding circumstances and considers such
factors as the youth of the accused, his lack of education, length of
any detention, prolonged nature of questioning, deprivation of food
or sleep, and the psychological impact of these things on the ac-
cused. No single factor is controlling, and the officer's failure to
inform the defendant of his fourth amendment protections or his
right to refuse consent does not render the consent involuntary.104
Where consent is obtained through coercion, it will not be
deemed voluntary. In Bumper v. North Carolina,10 5 the consent to
a search of a house by the defendant's grandmother was held to be
involuntary when the officer falsely claimed to have a search war-
98, Abell, 221 Va. at 617, 272 S.E.2d at 210.
99. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968).
100. The term defendant here refers to the person whose premises, property, or person
was the subject of a police investigation. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the consent of third parties.
101. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (quoting Bumper v. North Car-
olina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).
102. 412 U.S. at 222. See also Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 239 S.E.2d 112
(1977); Hairston v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 387, 219 S.E.2d 668 (1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 937 (1976).
103. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 7-1 to -15. The voluntariness of the consent is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the trial court and must be accepted on appeal unless
clearly erroneous. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
104. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
105. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). See also Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 205, 169 S.E.2d 580
(1969). Informing the defendant that an affidavit for a search warrant "was being prepared,"
did not render the defendant's consent involuntary in Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
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rant. In McMillon v. Commonwealth,10 6 the court noted that
"since arrest carries its own aura of coercion, the burden on the
government to show voluntary consent is particularly heavy. '10 7
When conducting a consent search the police have no more au-
thority than they have been given by the consent.' s The terms of
the defendant's consent will establish the permissible scope of the
search in regard to time, duration, area, and intensity. Thus con-
sent to search an apartment for a fugitive does not give the police
the privilege to search spaces which obviously could not hide a
man.10 9
2. Consent by a Third Party
One of the difficult concepts in the area of third-party searches
is the realization that one person is permitted to waive the right to
privacy of someone else. The theory behind third-party consent is
not particularly clear, but in United States v. Matlock,110 the
United States Supreme Court held that one who shares use, access,
or control of property or premises also shares in the right to con-
sent to a search."" Whatever the defendant's subjective expecta-
tion of privacy may be," 2 by sharing use, access, or control with a
third party the defendant is deemed to have "assumed the risk"
that the third party will consent to a search." 3
Although third-party consent searches arise most often in situa-
tions involving spouses and parent-children relationships, the legal
status of the parties is not the controlling factor. 114 It is the practi-
106. 212 Va. 505, 184 S.E.2d 773 (1971).
107. Id. at 509, 184 S.E.2d at 776 (quoting Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 163
(1st Cir. 1967)). But in Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 677, 239 S.E.2d 112, 117
(1977), the court found that voluntary consent was given by a defendant who was "in cus-
tody, handcuffed, sitting on the floor and surrounded by his armed captors." The officers
did not have their guns drawn, and no threats or promises were made to the defendant.
108. "Consent to search a garage would not implicitly authorize a search of an adjoining
house...." Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
109. Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974).
110. 415 U.S. 164, (1974).
111. See Black v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 277, 288 S.E.2d 449 (1982); Henry v. Common-
wealth, 211 Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970).
112. Consent "is a particularly open concept, which refers to both an 'internal' state of
mind and an 'external' performance . . . ." Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 55 (1974).
113. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
114. In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), the Court appeared unconcerned
with whether the defendant's roommate of the opposite sex was his wife, common-law wife,
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cal day-to-day living arrangements which determine whether the
third party had the right to consent to a search.11 5 In United
States v. Block," 6 the Fourth Circuit held that a parent could not
consent to the search of a footlocker which had been set aside for a
son's use. Thus, consent of a third party cannot extend to areas or
materials used exclusively by the defendant.1
7
3. Open View/Open Fields
The plain view doctrine previously discussed'"' involves the
seizure of an item in which the defendant unquestionably main-
tained an expectation of privacy. The open view/open fields con-
cept considered in this section addresses the issue of whether the
defendant has an expectation of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment. Stated conversely, the question is whether the police
conducted a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.""9
The fourth amendment which protects individuals in their "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects" does not extend to open fields. 20
Thus, no search warrant is necessary for a search of a field beyond
the curtilage of a dwelling house.' 2 ' Likewise, no search occurs
when the police observe an item which the defendant has exposed
to public view. It is "entirely lawful, for a police officer who is on a
public street or sidewalk to look, either deliberately or inadver-
or paramour. In Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406 (1962), the court dis-
cussed the effect of a parent's consent on the legality of a search and seizure.
115. Although hotel proprietors and landlords have a limited legal right of access to the
premises, this is not the type of access which empowers them to consent to a search of the
individual's room. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). See also Morris v. Com-
monwealth, 208 Va. 331, 157 S.E.2d 191 (1967) (the court held that a nurse lacked control
over the defendant's hospital room and thus could not consent to a taking of personal ef-
fects from the room). Cf. Craft v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 258, 269 S.E.2d 797 (1980) (the
court held that no search occurred when the emergency room surgeon gave the police a shirt
and bullet removed from the defendant).
116. 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978). Cf. Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d
799 (1970) (where the court held that the mother had a legal right to remove an item of first
class mail, addressed to their son, from the family mailbox and deliver it to the police); Rees
v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406 (1962) (where the defendant did not exclu-
sively occupy or use any portion of his parent's house).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978).
118. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
119. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-2 to -3.
120. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
121. Patler v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 448, 177 S.E.2d 618 (1970).
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tently, into an automobile parked on the street and to observe
what is exposed therein to open view."' 22
An individual may expose his property to open view, and
thereby relinquish his expectation of privacy, by abandoning the
property. 123 In Abel v. United States124 the Court held that the
fourth amendment does not protect property left in a hotel room
trashcan. Several cases involving the search of garbage cans placed
on the street have held that the items in question were aban-
doned. 125 When a person drops or throws contraband while he is
being followed or approached by an officer, the property is treated
as being abandoned. Such situations are commonly referred to as
"dropsy" cases and raise the question of whether police officers
"routinely perjure" themselves in testifying that the defendant
dropped the drugs when he saw the officer approaching. 2 '
4. Airport Searches
The outbreak of aircraft hijackings in the past decade has led to
the adoption of new measures to deal with the critical time when
passengers board an airplane. The Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's "profile" of potential hijackers was originally used to single
out individuals for a search.11 Today, a metal-detecting device
known as a magnetometer is most often used to screen all passen-
gers. 28 If a passenger activates the magnetometer he is usually
given a chance to remove all metal objects from his person and to
be scanned again by the magnetometer. If the magnetometer is
again activated there exists probable cause for a follow-up frisk or
122. Cook v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 71, 73, 216 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1975). In Shirley v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977), the court questioned whether the viewing of a
vehicle identification number could be considered a search. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-9
(Repl. Vol. 1980).
123. United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980). Hawley v. Commonwealth, 206
Va. 479, 144 S.E.2d 314 (1965). See also Craft v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 258, 269 S.E.2d
801 (1980), where the defendant voluntarily sought medical treatment to remove a bullet
from his body. The court held that no search or seizure occurred when the hospital gave the
bullet to the police.
124. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
125. United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978). Contra People v. Krivda, 5
Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1068 (1972).
126. See People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. 1970).
127. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
128. For an explanation of the workings of a magnetometer, see McGinley & Downs, Air-
port Searches and Seizures - A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 293 (1972).
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search.12
The Fourth Circuit has held that the use of the magnetometer
itself constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. 130 A mag-
netometer search "does not precisely fit into one of the previously
recognized categories for dispensing with a search warrant."' 3'11
Nonetheless, upon balancing the enormous dangers to life and
property against the slight intrusion upon privacy, airport searches
are normally held to be lawful under the general rubric of
"reasonableness."' 32
5. Border Searches
A search at a border incident to the entrance of a person into the
United States is not protected by the fourth amendment; hence
there is no requirement for probable cause or the issuance of a
warrant. "Travelers may be . . . stopped in crossing an interna-
tional boundary, because of national self-protection reasonably re-
quiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to
come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully
brought in. ' 133
Rules applying to border searches are relevant in Virginia be-
cause of the ports in the Tidewater area,34 and because an airport
at which passengers arrive after a non-stop flight from outside the
country is "the functional equivalent to a border ' of the United
States.'35 A search by customs agents of passengers at such an air-
port is not limited by the fourth amendment. 36 Thus, a person
and his baggage arriving at a customs area may be searched with-
129. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Kirsch, 493
F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974).
130. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
See also United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980) (dealing with X-ray scan-
ners), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981).
131. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1974). Most cases reject an
implied consent theory because such consent is not freely and voluntarily given. "To make
one choose between flying to one's destination and exercising one's constitutional
right . . . in many situations [is] a form of coercion." United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d
799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974). However, United States v. Edwards held that notice and consent
were factors to be considered under the general rubric of "reasonableness." See also United
States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980).
132. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
133. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
134. See, e.g., United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968).
135. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
136. See United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971).
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out the slightest suspicion. 137
While border searches are not controlled by the fourth amend-
ment, the nature and extent of the search by customs officials is
limited. Mere suspicion alone will not justify certain types of
searches. If a customs official wishes to have a person disrobe, a
real suspicion justifying the search must exist. If an examination of
body cavities is made, there must be a clear indication that contra-
band will be found.1 8
6. Inventory or Search of Vehicle Based on a Diminished Expec-
tation of Privacy
Earlier discussion considered searches of an automobile incident
to arrest' s3 or based upon exigent circumstances. 140 Such searches
did not focus upon the automobile as having a unique status in
fourth amendment law. The cases merely recognized that an auto-
mobile may be an area under the control of the arrestee or that the
mobility of an automobile may constitute one form of exigent cir-
cumstance. If the automobile has a distinct position in fourth
amendment law it is not because of a vehicle's mobility.1 41 What
makes the automobile unique is that "the extensive regulation of
motor vehicles"1 42 and the high incident of "police-citizen contact
involving automobiles" 143 diminish the expectation of privacy that
one can have with regard to motor vehicles. This diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in automobiles may be relevant in determining
the required level of probable cause and the necessity for a search
warrant.
44
137. See Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967). A "stop" beyond the
customs area "may be justified under circumstances less than those constituting probable
cause for arrest or search." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 (1981). See also
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
138. Henderson, 390 F.2d 805. See also United States v. Briones, 423 F.2d 742 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 933 (1970). By statute, body cavity searches must be conducted under
the supervision of medically trained personnel. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-59.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
139. See supra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
141. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that automobile searches have
been upheld when there was no real danger that the vehicle would be moved. See Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). See also Patty v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d 437 (1977).
142. See, e.g., VA. COD ANN. §§ 46.1-3, -7, -8, -9, -351.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980) (provisions for
stopping, inspecting, and seizing vehicles under certain conditions).
143. Cady, 413 U.S. 433.
144. See, e.g., Shirley v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977). In United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court characterized as an "extreme view" the
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One clearly distinct aspect of the so-called automobile exception
to the warrant requirement is the right of police to inventory the
contents of automobiles held in the custody of the police. In South
Dakota v. Opperman,145 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the right of the police to inventory an impounded vehicle for the
purpose of (1) protecting the owner's property while he is in cus-
tody or elsewhere, (2) protecting the officer against claims of the
owner for alleged missing property, and (3) protecting the police
and public from physical harm from the potentially dangerous con-
tents of a seized automobile. 14 The above justifications for an "in-
ventory" are distinct from the justifications for a "search" incident
to arrest or due to exigent circumstances. For a search incident to
arrest the police must have probable cause to arrest; for an exigent
circumstances search the police must have probable cause to be-
lieve seizable items are in the automobile; for an inventory the po-
lice must be acting pursuant to police department regulations cov-
ering impounded automobiles. 147 Thus the inventory exception
does not apply when the inventory is merely a pretext concealing
an investigatory police motive.148 A recent Virginia statute further
limits the inventory exception by denying the police authority to
impound and inventory an automobile when the arrested driver
designates another person at the scene to remove the vehicle from
the scene of the arrest.1 49
An inventory of the contents of an automobile includes the au-
thority to open and inventory sealed containers found in the vehi-
cle. In Hamby v. Commonwealth15 0 the court upheld the opening
of an unlocked briefcase found in the vehicle's interior. The court
government's argument that the warrant clause did not apply to automobiles. Thus, while
the expectation of privacy in automobiles is diminished when compared to dwellings, some
expectation of privacy in automobiles remains and is protected by the fourth amendment.
145. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
146. See Girardi v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 459, 270 S.E.2d 743 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 913 (1981); Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980); Cabbler v.
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
147. See supra note 146.
148. In Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980), the court con-
trasted an investigatory police motive with the "benign purposes" underlying inventory
searches.
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-80.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983). The statute deals only with impounding
the vehicle after arrest when "there is no legal cause for the retention of the motor vehicle."
The statute would not apply to situations where the police have probable cause to search
the vehicle. See supra notes 60-98 and accompanying text. See also BACIGAL, supra note 9, §
2-42.
150. 222 Va. 257, 279 S.E.2d 163 (1981).
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rejected the argument that an inventory search is limited to simply
sealing and removing personal luggage as a whole, and thus limited
Arkansas v. Sanders151 to searches of containers incident to arrest
or based upon exigent circumstances. 152
7. Search of Inmates
In Bell v. Wolfish 5 ' the United States Supreme Court assumed
arguendo that the fourth amendment has some application to
prison inmates, but went on to note that any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy would be of a diminished scope. The Virginia Su-
preme Court has refused to recognize a prisoner's expectation of
privacy in cells and lockers when prison security officers are
searching for drugs and weapons. In Marrero v. Commonwealth'M
the Court held that the time and manner of such searches must be
left to the discretion of prison authorities. The Court approved the
random 55 search of inmates and rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that prison officials must demonstrate an "informed judg-
ment of the actual need for the search."' '
III. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
A. Generally
Prior to Katz v. United States 7 the Supreme Court had char-
acterized the fourth amendment as primarily concerned with
searches for evidence of criminal activity and only peripherally
concerned with the right of privacy.' 58 Thus, in Frank v. Mary-
land,'59 the Court held that "inspections" by health department
officials were not "searches" which triggered fourth amendment
protections. The Frank case was overturned in Camara v. Munici-
pal Court 60 when the Court stated that it was "anomalous to say
151. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Much of the rationale of Arkansas v. Sanders was disapproved
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
152. See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
153. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
154. 222 Va. 754, 284 S.E.2d 809 (1981).
155. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding unconstitutional the "random"
stopping of automobiles).
156. Marrero, 222 Va. at 756, 284 S.E.2d at 810.
157. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
158. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-2.
159. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
160. 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (com-
panion case to Camara).
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that the individual and his private property are fully pro-
tected .. .only when the individual is suspected of criminal be-
havior." Camara and Katz together define a search as any govern-
ment action which intrudes upon a legitimate expectation of
privacy. The underlying motivation for the search, whether it be
criminal investigation or benign purposes of public health and
safety, is no longer relevant in defining the scope of fourth amend-
ment protections."' 1
Having placed administrative searches within the scope of the
fourth amendment, Camara went on to hold that, absent consent
or exigent circumstances,162 a search warrant is required before the
administrative search can take place. The administrative search
warrant, however, does not have to be based on traditional proba-
ble cause which requires a reasonable belief that items related to a
crime are located in the premises that the government seeks to
enter.163 Camara held that the reasonableness of the government's
request for an administrative search warrant will be determined by
considering such general factors as the passage of time since the
last inspection, the condition of the particular building, conditions
in the general area, or the need for periodic inspections in an en-
tire area of the community. It is clear that, unlike a criminal
search warrant, an administrative search warrant need not be
based on specific knowledge of a violation in a particular building.
The Virginia Code sets forth separate procedures for inspections
in connection with the manufacturing, emitting or presence of a
toxic substance. 64 Such inspections differ from traditional admin-
istrative searches in the following regard: (1) the inspection war-
rant must be issued by a judge of the circuit court; 65 (2) consent to
enter the premises must be sought and refused before a warrant
may issue;16 6 (3) in the case of entry into a dwelling, notice that a
warrant has been issued must be given at least twenty-four hours
before the warrant is executed;16 7 (4) the inspection warrant is
161. But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (inspection "visits" by welfare officials
not searches within the traditional meaning of that term).
162. See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
163. See BACIGAL, supra note 9, § 4-6.
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-393 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
165. Id.
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-394 (Repl. Vol. 1983). Consent need not be sought if the affida-
vit for a warrant sets forth facts reasonably justifying the failure to seek consent. Id.
167. Id. § 19.2-396 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
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valid for a maximum of ten days;' 8 (5) the executing officers may
not effectuate a forcible entry, an entry, or an inspection in the
absence of the owner, custodian or possessor of the premises unless
specifically authorized by the issuing judge."6 9
B. Exceptions to the Administrative Warrant Requirement
In extending the warrant requirement to administrative
searches, Camara v. Municipal Court7 ° recognized two exceptions:
(1) consent; and (2) emergency situations. As to consent searches
the Court recognized that "most citizens allowed inspection of
their property without a warrant" and consequently "warrants
should normally be sought only after entry is refused.''7 The
Court has never indicated that consent to an administrative search
differs from consent to a search for evidence of criminal activity.
Presumably, the free and voluntary consent standard of
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte7 2  applies to administrative
searches.1
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The Court has recognized a form of "implied consent" which is
applicable to inspections of certain heavily regulated businesses. In
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States17 4 (liquor distributor),
United States v. Biswell 7 5 (firearm dealer), and Donovan v.
Dewey17 6 (Mine Safety and Health Act), the Court held that the
defendant's decision to enter into a business which is subject to
heavy government regulation amounts to implied consent to the
warrantless inspections authorized by existing statutes and admin-
istrative regulations. The implied consent doctrine was limited to
closely regulated industries in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,17 7 where
the Court refused to approve warrantless inspections under the
broadly applicable Occupational Safety and Health Act. As to the
168. Id. § 19.2-395 (Repl. Vol. 1983). All other warrants are valid for 15 days. See BACI-
GAL, supra note 9, § 4-13.
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-396 (Repl. Vol. 1983). The judge may authorize forcible entry
upon a reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat to public safety, or where reasonable
attempts to serve a previous warrant have been unsuccesful. Id.
170. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
171. Id. at 539.
172. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
173. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
174. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
175. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
176. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
177. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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emergency exception to the administrative warrant requirement,
such emergencies rarely occur in the housing inspection or business
inspection context. The leading case in the area of emergency in-
spections is Michigan v. Tyler,17 8 which involved an inspection of
the scene of a fire by fire marshals.179 The case involved three sep-
arate inspections made: (1) while the firefighters were still at the
scene, (2) a few hours later, and (3) some weeks later. The Court
held that the second inspection was an extension of the first in-
spection, thus both inspections were lawful because "officials need
no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished." The third
inspection, however, occurred after the exigent circumstances had
ceased. Thus the warrantless inspection in the absence of an emer-
gency was unlawful.
The holding in Michigan v. Tyler raises serious doubts about the
continuing validity of Bennett v. Commonwealth,180 where the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court upheld a warrantless entry by fire marshals
the day following a fire.
178. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
179. In considering an inspection after the fire was extinguished, the Supreme Court
noted that the initial entry by the firemen was clearly lawful. "[I]t would defy reason to
suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning structure
to put out the blaze." Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509.
180. 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215 (1972).
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